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A continuous variable ping-pong scheme, which is utilized to generate deterministically private
key, is proposed. The proposed scheme is implemented physically by using Gaussian-modulated
squeezed states. The deterministic way, i.e., no basis reconciliation between two parties, leads a
two-times efficiency comparing to the standard quantum key distribution schemes. Especially, the
separate control mode does not need in the proposed scheme so that it is simpler and more available
than previous ping-pong schemes. The attacker may be detected easily through the fidelity of the
transmitted signal, and may not be successful in the beam splitter attack strategy.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk
The standard quantum key distribution (QKD) scheme [1] provides a novel way of generation and distribution of
secret key. Its security is guaranteed by the law of quantum mechanics [2, 3, 4]. The intrinsical basis reconciliation,
which is significant in guaranteeing the security, means that the standard QKD is nondeterministic. Unfortunately,
the nondeterministic property results in loss of many qubits, consequently, the efficiency is very low. To improve
the efficiency, several deterministic QKD schemes were proposed recently by using technique of ping-pong of photon
between two parties [5, 6, 7]. These schemes are implemented in discrete variable. While the final key is gener-
ated through a message-mode and the security is guaranteed by a separate control-mode. However, the separate
control-mode in the previous ping-pong schemes leads a higher communication complexity and a more complicated
experimental realization. In addition, discrete variable is not easy in generation as well as detection so that continuous
variable (CV) becomes a favored candidate in the quantum cryptography [8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15].
In this letter, a continuous variable ping-pong scheme, which is implemented by using the Gaussian-modulated
squeezed states, is firstly proposed. Since the proposed scheme does not need the basis reconciliation when the
communicators, i.e., Alice and Bob, exchange the key information, its efficiency is two times of the standard CV QKD
schemes. Particularly, the separate control-mode, which is necessary in the discrete-variable (DV) ping-pong schemes,
can be omitted. This characteristic makes the proposed scheme be feasible in experimental realization. In addition,
the channel capacity is higher than that of the DV ping-pong schemes. The security analysis based on Shannon
information theory shows clearly the security against the beam splitter attack strategy. In a lossy channel, when the
transmission is larger than 0.728 the security can be warranted.
The proposed scheme, which is sketched in Fig.1, executes the following. Step 1, Bob operates an initial vacuum
state |0〉 with either operator P = D(α)S(r) or P⊥ = D(iα)S(−r) which are regarded as a pair of bases, where S(r)
is the squeezing operator and r is the squeezed factor, D(α) is a displacement operator which is employed to add
noise, and α is a real number. Step 2, Bob sends the generated state to Alice through a public quantum channel.
Step 3, having operated the received state by a proper displacement operator D(α′ = x+ ix), Alice returns the state
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2to Bob, where x is a random number which is drawn from Gaussian probability distribution. Step 4, if the base P is
employed in the step 1, Bob applies D(−α) on the returned mode, and measures X1. Otherwise, Bob applies D(−iα)
on the returned mode, and measures X2. The canonical quadratures X1 and X2 are defined as X1 =
1
2
(aˆ + aˆ†)
and X2 =
1
2i
(aˆ − aˆ†). Step 5, Alice randomly selects some x values, and then sends the chosen values and their
corresponding time slots to Bob through a public classic channel. Step 6, after has received Alice’s values, Bob
calculates statistically the fidelity by using the received values and his corresponding measured results. Then Bob
detects whether Eve is absent or not by using the calculated fidelity.
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FIG. 1: Scheme of the deterministic quantum key distribution using Gaussian-modulated squeezed states. The Arabian numbers
denote the modes in Heisenburg picture.
We explain briefly above protocol in the physical way. Bob’s operation in step 1 yields a squeezed coherent state
either |α, r〉 = D(α)S(r)|0〉 or |iα,−r〉 = D(iα)S(−r)|0〉. For simplicity, we only illuminate the evolvement of the
state |α, r〉 thereafter since the state |iα,−r〉 may be treated with in a same way. Since the initial vacuum state |0〉 is a
Gaussian state, the canonical quadratures X11 and X
1
2 follow the Gaussian probability distribution, i.e., X
1
1 ∼ N(0, 14 )
and X1
2
∼ N(0, 1
4
), where X ik(k = 1, 2) represents Xk(k = 1, 2) of the mode aˆi, Γ ∼ N(µ, σ2) denotes that random
variable Γ follows Gaussian probability distribution with the average value µ and the variance σ2. Choosing a random
disturbance α with distribution A ∼ N(0,Σ2), one has X31 ∼ N(0,Σ2 + 14e−2r) and X32 ∼ N(0, 14e2r). Obviously,
when the following condition is satisfied, i.e.,
Σ2 +
1
4
e−2r =
1
4
e2r, (1)
X3
1
and X3
2
follows the same probability distribution. Subsequently, Eve cannot distinguish the output states |α, r〉
and |iα,−r〉 whatever the statistics Eve accumulates. Making use of the operator D(α′ = x+ ix) and the distribution
X ∼ N(0,Σ′2), one may easily obtain X5
1
∼ N(0,Σ2 + 1
4
e−2r + Σ
′2
) and X5
2
∼ N(0, 1
4
e2r + Σ
′2
). After has received
the state encoded by Alice, Bob removes the added quantum noise so that he can decode Alice’s message. This
operation gives the mode aˆ7 with X
7
1
∼ N(0, 1
4
e−2r +Σ
′2
) and X7
2
∼ N(0, 1
4
e2r +Σ
′2
). Finally, Bob measures X7
1
on
the received state to decode Alice’s message.
Now we move on the security analysis. Suppose Eve splits the forward and backward beams as depicted in Fig.1,
then she coherently measures the intercepted beams to obtain the maximal information. To show the security of the
proposed scheme against above attack strategy, i.e., the general beam splitter attack strategy, we adopt the following
3criterion which is used prevalently for QKD scheme [1, 16],
∆I = I(α, β) − Imax(α, ǫ) > 0, (2)
where I(α, β) is the mutual information between Alice and Bob, and Imax(α, ǫ) is the maximal mutual information
between Alice and Eve. According to Shannon information theory [17], the channel capacity of the additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel is given by,
I =
1
2
log2(1 + γ), (3)
where γ = PS/PN is the signal-noise ratio, PS and PN are the variances of the signal and noise probability distributions
respectively. If the signal follows the Gaussian distribution, and the channel is an AWGN channel, the channel
capacity is the mutual information of the communication parties. In the followings, first we calculate the probability
distributions of X1 and X2 in all modes as depicted in Fig.1, then calculate I(α, β) and Imax(α, ǫ) according to Eq.(3).
A beam splitter (BS) is always employed to split the laser beam. According to Fig.1, inputs of the BS1 are given
by,
X31 = e
−rX11 +A, X
3
2 = e
rX12 . (4)
and two output modes of BS1 are,
X41 =
√
η1X
3
1 +
√
1− η1Xvac11 ,
X42 =
√
η1X
3
2 +
√
1− η1Xvac12 ,
X8
1
=
√
η1X
vac1
1
−
√
1− η1X31 ,
X82 =
√
η1X
vac1
2 −
√
1− η1X32 , (5)
where η1 is the transmittance coefficient of BS1. Consider Alice’s operation of applying the displacement operator
D(α
′
= x+ ix) on the mode aˆ4, the inputs of the BS2 are given by,
X51 = X
4
1 +X, X
5
2 = X
4
2 +X. (6)
Similarly, the outputs of the BS2 are obtained as following,
X6
1
=
√
η2X
5
1
+
√
1− η2Xvac21 ,
X62 =
√
η2X
5
2 +
√
1− η2Xvac22 ,
X9
1
=
√
η2X
vac2
1
−
√
1− η2X51 ,
X92 =
√
η2X
vac2
2 −
√
1− η2X52 , (7)
where η2 is the transmittance coefficient of BS2. Applying the operator D(−α) on mode aˆ6 yields,
X7
1
= X6
1
−A, X7
2
= X6
2
. (8)
Combining Eqs.(4) ∼ (8) gives,
X71 =
√
η2[
√
η1(e
−rX11 +A) +
√
1− η1Xvac11 +X ] +
√
1− η2Xvac21 −A,
X7
2
=
√
η2(
√
η1e
rX1
2
+
√
1− η1Xvac12 +X) +
√
1− η2Xvac22 , (9)
4where the random variables Xjk (k = 1, 2, j = vac1, vac2) follow the Gaussian probability distributions, i.e.,
Xjk ∼ N(0,
1
4
). (10)
Making use of Eqs.(1), (9) and (10), the variances of X7
1
and X7
2
are obtained,
〈(∆X7
1
)2〉 = 1
4
η1η2e
−2r +
1
4
(1 −√η1η2)2(e2r − e−2r)
+η2Σ
′
2 +
1
4
[(1 − η2) + (1− η1)η2], (11)
〈(∆X7
2
)2〉 = 1
4
η1η2e
2r + η2Σ
′
2 +
1
4
[(1− η2) + (1− η1)η2].
Using the first expression in Eq.(11) gives the signal-noise ratio,
γαβ =
M
N
. (12)
where M = η2Σ
′
2 and N = 1
4
η1η2e
−2r + 1
4
(1 − √η1η2)2(e2r − e−2r) + 14 [(1 − η2) + (1 − η1)η2]. Thus the mutual
information between Alice and Bob is,
I(α, β) =
1
2
log2(1 + γαβ). (13)
When η1 = η2 = 1, above equation can be written as C(α, β) =
1
2
log
2
(1 + 4Σ
′
2
e−2r
), where C(α, β) is the mutual
information between Alice and Bob without eavesdropping. Obviously, C(α, β) increases with r and Σ
′
2. Actually,
C(α, β) is the channel capacity of the communication between Alice and Bob without eavesdropping. As an example,
one may easily obtain C(α, β) = 8.6 bits when r = 3,Σ′ = 10, which is apparently larger than that of the DV quantum
communication scheme.
The maximal information Imax(α, ǫ) may be obtained by Eve through measuring both aˆ8 and aˆ9. Assume that
Eve is an evil quantum physicist who is able to build all devices that are allowed by the laws of quantum mechanics.
Then Eve may build an advice to measure XEve1 and X
Eve
2 of the mode aˆEve = aˆ9 − kaˆ8, where k is a parameter to
be optimized. Using the expressions of X8k in Eq.(5) and X
9
k in Eq.(7), X
Eve
1
and XEve
2
may be easily obtained,
XEve
1
= −[
√
η1(1− η2)− k
√
1− η1](e−rX11 +A)−
√
1− η2X − [
√
(1− η1)(1− η2) + k√η1]Xvac11 +
√
η2X
vac2
1
, (14)
XEve2 = −[
√
η1(1− η2)− k
√
1− η1]erX12 −
√
1− η2X −
[
√
(1− η1)(1− η2) + k√η1]Xvac12 +
√
η2X
vac2
2
.
Combining Eq.(1) and Eq.(14), one may find that the random variables XEve
1
and XEve
2
follow the same probability
distribution. Accordingly, Eve obtains the same signal-noise ratios in XEve1 and X
Eve
2 , i.e., γαǫXEve
1
= γαǫXEve
2
=
4(1− η2)Σ′2/µ+ ν, where µ = (
√
η1(1− η2) − k
√
1− η1)2e2r and ν = (
√
(1− η1)(1− η2) + k√η1)2 + η2. When
k = (e2r + 1)
√
η1(1− η1)(1− η2)/(e2r(1− η1) + η1), Eve obtains the maximal mutual information,
Imax(α, ǫ) = IX1(α, ǫ) = IX2(α, ǫ). (15)
Substituting Eqs.(13) and (15) into Eq.(2) gives the secret information rate ∆I. Fig.2 shows the properties of ∆I
changing with η1, η2. One may see that ∆I increases with increasing of η1, η2. In addition, ∆I may be negative when
5η1 and η2 are small, which implicates that Eve may obtain more useful information by choosing two proper beam
splitters than Bob. Fortunately, this attack strategy does not influence the security of the proposed scheme since Eve
may be detected easily in this situation.
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FIG. 2: Property of ∆I (unit:bit) changing with η1, η2. The employed parameters are r = 3 and Σ
′
2 = 100.
Now we investigate how to detect Eve. A separate control-mode is always employed to detect the eavesdropping
in the previous ping-pong schemes. However, this approach does not benefit the efficiency of the scheme. Here we
propose a new approach which is more efficient than the separate control-mode approach. After finished the step 4,
Alice tells Bob some values of random variable X and the corresponding time slots through a classical public channel.
After received Alice’s results, Bob calculates the fidelity,
F = 〈αin|ρout|αin〉 = πQ(αin), (16)
where |αin〉 = |0〉, ρout = |αout〉〈αout|, and |αout〉 = S(−r)D(−α′ )|Ψ〉 with the quantum state |Ψ〉 in mode aˆ7.
The Q function for a squeezed state is defined as that in [18]. In an ideal (no-loss) quantum channel, the fidelity
satisfies F = 1 without eavesdropping and F < 1 with eavesdropping. Therefore the fidelity F can be employed as
an important parameter for Eve detection. Making use of the state |αout〉 in the Heisenburg picture and Eq.(9), one
obtains,
Xout
1
= er{√η2[√η1(e−rX11 +A) +
√
1− η1Xvac11 +X ] +
√
1− η2Xvac21 −A−X}
Xout2 = e
−r[
√
η2(
√
η1e
rX12 +
√
1− η1Xvac12 +X) +
√
1− η2Xvac22 −X ]. (17)
Using Eqs.(10) and (17), the variances of Xout
1
and Xout
2
are given by,
〈(∆Xout
1
)2〉 = e2r{1
4
η1η2e
−2r + (1 −√η1η2)2Σ2
+ (
√
η2 − 1)2Σ
′
2 +
1
4
[(1 − η2) + (1− η1)η2]},
〈(∆Xout
2
)2〉 = e−2r{1
4
η1η2e
2r + (
√
η
2
− 1)2Σ′2
+
1
4
[(1− η2) + (1− η1)η2]}. (18)
The fidelity F is obtained as the following form,
F =
2
√
(4〈(∆Xout
1
)2〉+ 1)(4〈(∆Xout
2
)2〉+ 1) . (19)
6Substituting Eq.(18) into Eq.(19), one may calculate the fidelity. Numerical solutions of Eq.(19) are depicted in Fig.3.
With η1 and η2 decreasing the fidelity F decreases rapidly. Accordingly, any eavesdropping can be detected by Alice
and Bob by using the fidelity F .
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FIG. 3: The dependence of fidelity F on η1 and η2, the chosen parameters are r = 3 and Σ
′
2 = 100.
The relationship between ∆Imin and F is useful for detecting eavesdropping. The analytical expression for these
variables is very prolix, so only the numerical solutions, which are plotted in Fig.4, are presented. If Eve doesn’t exist,
i.e., F = 1, one may easily obtain the secret information rate ∆Imin = I(α, β) = 8.6 bits. However, the condition
of F = 1 is too strict in practices. Fortunately, there is an important value Fc which may be obtained from Fig.4,
i.e., Fc = 0.02. When F > Fc one has ∆Imin > 0, which means Eve’s eavesdropping does not influence the security
of the final key. While F < Fc there is a negative information rate. In this case, Alice and Bob has to discard the
communication.
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FIG. 4: The relationship between ∆Imin (unit:bit) and F . The parameters are r = 3 and Σ
′
2 = 100.
When the line has a transmission η over the separation between Alice and Bob, the best attack strategy for Eve is to
take a fraction 1− η of the beam and then send the fraction η forward through her own lossless line. In this situation,
the eavesdropping can not be detected but the secure QKD is possible under a proper condition. Eve’s maximum
information is given by Eq.(15) with η1 = η2 = η. Numerical calculation shows ∆I ≥ 0 when η ≥ 0.728. Accordingly,
Alice and Bob can perform a deterministic QKD with security when the line has a transmission η ≥ 0.728. One may
recall that the coherent state quantum key distribution beats the loss limit η = 0.5 by applying technique of reverse
reconciliation [15] or postselection [19]. Actually, with the technique of the reverse reconciliation or the postselection,
the loss limit η = 0.728 is anticipated to be beaten in the proposed scheme [20].
7In conclusion, a deterministic QKD scheme using Gaussian-modulated squeezed states is proposed. The character-
istic of no basis reconciliation yields a two-times efficiency than that of the CV standard QKD schemes. Especially,
the separate control-mode does not need in the proposed scheme so that the scheme is more feasible in experimental
realization. The fidelity is employed to detect the eavesdropper and resist the beam splitter attack strategy. In a
lossy channel, a secure scheme requires the transmission of η > 0.728.
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